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different mechanisms of private ordering, which have developed in ecommerce. This illustrates that electronic market places fulfil an essential
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TRANSNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW: CO-REGULATION
OF B2C-E-COMMERCE
Gralf-Peter Calliess∗

I. INTRODUCTION
A central function of private law is to facilitate market exchange by
enabling economic actors to conciliate their mutual expectations
and, thus, to cooperate. This coordinative function of private law
becomes manifest in the definition of property rights and the
enforcement of contractual obligations. Since the principle of party
autonomy leaves the decision on substantive issues to contractual
self-regulation, private law in this respect is merely a public
framework for private ordering. In the modern welfare state,
however, private law also fulfils a regulatory function in establishing
certain constraints to party autonomy with respect to commutative
justice and public policy. The legislation on the protection of
consumers, as the weaker party in business transactions, figures as
a prominent example (Grundmann, Kerber, and Weatherill, 2001).
While consumer protection within domestic markets is a wellestablished concept, the same does not hold for the international
realm, where the enforcement of national protection regimes is
hampered by a lack of international cooperation. Until recently this
has posed not much of a problem, since consumers rarely engaged
in international commerce directly. With the advent of the Internet,
however, matters have changed dramatically. In the networked
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economy, consumers increasingly shop online often without
noticing that they get involved in cross-border situations, in which
businesses are able to contract around national consumer rights by
means of forum shopping and choice of law (Rothchild, 1999: 893;
Calliess, 2006: ch 2-3).
It has been in this context that the issue of consumer confidence in
business to consumer electronic commerce ('b2c-e-commerce')
entered the global agenda (European Commission, 1997; Federal
Trade Commission, 2000; OECD, 2006a). While states remained
reluctant to regulate cross-border consumer contracts by means of
multilateral treaties, international organisations called for coregulatory efforts in addressing the issue. Hence, the 1999 OECD
Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic
Commerce (the 'OECD Guidelines’) read:
'Part II, VI: B.: Businesses, consumer representatives and
governments should work together to continue to use
and develop fair, effective and transparent selfregulatory and other policies and procedures, including
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, to address
consumer complaints and to resolve consumer disputes
arising from business-to-consumer electronic commerce,
with special attention to cross-border transactions. […]
Part III: To achieve the purpose of this Recommendation,
Member countries should […] encourage continued
private sector leadership that includes the participation
of consumer representatives in the development of
effective self-regulatory mechanisms that contain
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specific, substantive rules for dispute resolution and
compliance mechanisms.'1 (see also OECD, 2002)
It is widely accepted that international merchants are able to solve
their coordination problems by means of private ordering and,
therefore, that they should be allowed to opt out of the state’s legal
system in handing over disputes to arbitration under the law
merchant (Berger, 1999; Zumbansen, 2002; general critique at
Cutler, 2003). This assumption's underlying rationale is that there is
an absence of public interest in international commerce as
merchants presumably meet on an equal footing. Regarding
consumer contracts, in turn, private ordering is generally not
thought to be an effective and legitimate means for achieving the
regulatory functions of private law (Hadfield 2001: 45; European
Consumer Law Group, 2001). Thus, the interesting question arises
what the concept of co-regulation promoted by the OECD exactly
entails, and whether it could at all work in the context of b2c-ecommerce.
In the following, I intend to examine the potential role of private
ordering and co-regulation in the area of cross-border consumer
contracts. I start with a survey of the different mechanisms of
private ordering, which have developed in e-commerce (I.). This
illustrates that electronic market places fulfil an essential role in
bundling different means of private ordering into what I call
transnational civil regimes for consumer protection (II.). Finally, I aim
at demonstrating how states, industry, and civil society actors can
jointly contribute to the establishment of a civil constitution for such
regimes with respect to the regulatory functions of private law
(III.).

The Guidelines are available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf. (All links to the Internet
in this text are last checked on 20 January 2007.)

1
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II. PRIVATE ORDERING IN B2C-E-COMMERCE
There is a plethora of literature on private ordering in commercial
relations, describing various governance mechanisms that
merchants employ in order to reduce the likelihood of
opportunistic behaviour among contractual parties (Bernstein,
1992; Benson, 1999; Aviram, 2004; Williamson, 2005; Greif, 2006).
These mechanisms are generally applied 'in the shadow of law', but
their use is rendered essential in a situation of 'lawlessness', eg, in
low developed countries with inefficient legal systems (Dixit, 2004).
The latter situation resembles the one in cross-border commerce in
which businesses are confronted with constitutional uncertainties
resulting from multi-jurisdictional litigation (Schmidtchen, 1990;
Streit and Mangels, 1996). In this part of my paper I intend to
demonstrate, how the governance mechanisms employed by
international merchants are increasingly adapted to b2c-ecommerce transactions as well.

A. ONLINE REPUTATION
One important mechanism of contractual governance is reputation:
people do not engage in opportunistic behaviour in a certain
transaction, because they fear that other parties might refrain from
entering into future transactions with partners which on the
relevant market have a reputation as bad co-operators (Posner,
2000). But the collection and processing of information on the past
performance of potential contract partners is costly, since it usually
is not spread in an organized manner but rather spontaneously. For
this reason the reputation mechanism is categorized as 'informal
third-party control' (Panther, 2000). It follows, that the reputation
mechanism works most effectively for high volume transactions
which legitimize the involved information costs as well as on
markets with a limited number of players which interact frequently
and, thus, have a high probability of meeting repeatedly (Leeson,
forthcoming). The interactive communication capabilities of the
Internet, however, have enabled the establishment of large-scale,
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'word-of-mouth'-networks at low cost. Online feedback
mechanisms introduced by electronic market places have led to an
increasing formalisation of the reputation mechanism (Dellarocas,
2003: 1407). In the following, I shall discuss the 'eBay'-feedback
system as an example for the adaptation of the reputation
mechanism to the needs of large scale and small volume consumer
markets with a low probability of repeated transactions (Baron,
2002; Resnick et al., 2006).
In order to enter 'eBay's' electronic market place, seller and buyer
first have to become registered members. 'eBay' offers different
procedures for identity check, where the appliance of the most
rigorous check is indicated by a symbol attached to the member's
name. In the aftermath of every transaction, buyer and seller can
mutually assess each other—positively, neutral or negatively—and
can briefly justify their decision. Negative assessments can be
commented on by the assessed and are allowed to be taken back by
mutual agreement. In this way, multiple assessments constitute a
rating profile of every member, the quality of which is indicated
after the member's name by stars and shooting stars in different
colorings. This allows potential transaction partners to get
information about each other before completion of a contract.2
Furthermore, those vendors receive the status of a 'PowerSeller'
who on average have sold more than 300 items within the last three
months or who have generated a turnover of 3,000 Euro and whose
ratings are positive to more than 98 percent. Again, this is indicated
by a particular symbol after the member's name. New members
and those members who have changed their member name are also
indicated by particular symbols. In sum, 'eBay' provides a highly
formalized reputation system, which offers its members a high

In principle, this only applies to the buyer, as the vendor cannot know
the winner of an auction in advance. Recently, however, eBay has provided
sellers with the option of limiting their offer to buyers from a particular region or
with a particular minimum rating profile.
2
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degree of transparency through information about the
trustworthiness of potential contractual partners. Shopping with a
commercial 'PowerSeller' can be considered as safe as shopping
with a traditional high street brand like Marks and Spencer for
example. Yet, occasional private sellers can also obtain an
impeccable reputation over a longer period of time. In contrast, it is
more risky to complete a contract with a new vendor lacking a
distinct member profile. In such a case, every member has to
consider whether she wants to take such a risk; especially, if higher
sums of money are involved, additional precautionary measures
are available such as an escrow service, which is further detailed
below.

B. TRUSTMARKS AND CODES OF CONDUCT
Following the principle 'caveat emptor', trustmarks offer a
functional equivalent to trademarks in that both bundle
information on a supplier in an easily accessible form and, thus,
replace for individual investigations into its reputation. Trustmarks
are of special importance to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
(SMEs) which are unable to build up their own trademark on the
global electronic market place. They are awarded to vendors by a
neutral third party, given that specific criteria prescribed in a code
of conduct have been met (for the distinction of 'trust' in a vendor
and 'reliance' on an independent third party see Pichler, 2000).
Originally, trustmarks were awarded to products with regard to
their technical standard. In principle, trustmarks can also be used to
establish socio-ethical standards or to secure compliance with legal
norms. Private, state and hybrid institutions can play a crucial part
in their award and monitoring. Businesses voluntarily submit
themselves to such standards and monitoring as they hope to gain
competitive advantages through the trustmark. The German 'blue
angel' and the European 'eco-label' applied such a conception to
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environmental standards (cf. Teubner, Farmer, and Murphy, 1994;
Pfaff and Sanchirico, 2000: 189).3 In the debate over Internet
governance, such trustmarks are discussed as a means for the
protection of privacy, consumers, and children (Wagemans, 2003;
Spletter, 2003).
Following the Internet euphoria of the late nineties, in b2c-ecommerce numerous trustmark schemes have been established, but
only a few of those have achieved some significance in the market
place (see GBDE, 2000; see also Nordquist, Andersson, and
Dzepina, 2002). Particularly successful has been the 'BBBOnLine
Reliability Seal', which following an initiative by the Canadian and
US-American Chambers of Commerce is used by almost 20,000 web
pages.4 In order to obtain the seal, an Internet vendor has among
other things to become a member of the 'Better Business Bureau'
(BBB) located at the headquarters of her business, he has to follow
the 'BBB Code of Online Business Practices'5 based on the 'OECD
Guidelines' and she has to subject herself to an alternative dispute
resolution procedure that accords with BBB's fairness criteria.6 To
give an example, a pre-dispute, binding arbitration clause in a
contract is only admissible, if the consumer has been fully informed
about its consequences and costs, provided that the consumer signs

Cf. http://blauer-engel.de and http://www.eco-label.com/german/; for
a survey of environmental trustmarks see www.label-online.de.
4
See http://www.bbbonline.org/consumer
5
Available at:
http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/code/CodeEnglish.doc
6
'To agree to participate in binding arbitration under BBB Rules of
Arbitration (Binding) if the consumer also agrees, or in non-binding informal
dispute settlement (IDS) under the BBB Rules for IDS for unresolved consumer
complaints involving Participant's products or services. Alternatively, a
company may pre-commit to a dispute settlement process through a provider
other than the BBB, if the BBB determines the dispute settlement process
substantially complies with BBB consumer dispute resolution criteria.”, available
at: http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/dr.asp.
3
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the clause separately and that such acceptance is not a precondition
for the transaction itself.7
With more than 1500 certified traders the private company 'Trusted
Shops' is one of the leading providers of trustmarks in Europe.8
Participating traders have to meet certification criteria, which
follow current German and European legal regulations in the field
of distant selling and electronic commerce.9 Furthermore, 'Trusted
Shops' assessment encompasses credit ratings, safety technology,
transparency of prices, costumer services and privacy issues. In
collaboration with the credit insurer 'Atradius', 'Trusted Shops'
additionally offers a money-back guarantee covering failed
delivery, failed refund after return, and credit card fraud, which is
free of cost to buyers. Moreover, 'Trusted Shops' provides a central
customer service and dispute resolution procedure. Customers can
contact a multilingual service centre with any arising issue via
phone, email or Internet. According to 'Trusted Shops', thus far
there has been not a single court case filed between a customer and
an online shop because of the mediation procedures in place.
Certification criteria are continuously revised in collaboration with
an advisory board encompassing among others members of
consumer protection agencies and academics. Participating vendors
are informed about new developments in law. All online shops can
be accessed via a central portal, which consumers can use to search

7
'In order to ensure that the consumer has knowingly chosen arbitration
as the method of resolving disputes covered by the arbitration clause, binding
arbitration clauses must contain the following: A separate signature line,
appearing immediately below the arbitration clause, for the consumer to sign to
acknowledge acceptance of the terms of the arbitration clause; and, a statement
that the consumer will not be bound by the terms of the clause unless the
consumer signs on the signature line.’:
http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/dr.asp.
8
For the following see:
http://www.trustedshops.com/en/trustedshops/index.html.
9
http://www.trustedshops.com/en/shops/obligations_en.html
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for particular goods. For all mentioned services vendors pay
graded fees according to their turnover. Additionally, for their
online shops and advertising campaigns vendors are offered precertified web hosting and software solutions. Although also big
brands like 'Aral', 'Dell', 'Dorint', etc. have joined; 'Trusted Shops'
remains committed to be a platform that especially allows SMEs to
access e-commerce.
This example highlights that trustmark providers can generate a
realm of private order, which rests not only on norms as part of
codes of conduct but also on a combination of an insurance for filed
payment and alternative dispute resolution procedures. Such an
arrangement increases the security level to such an extent that eshopping is rendered more reliable than traditional brick and
mortar business dealings, in which customers have to assert their
legal rights in court and in which they carry the risk of insolvency.
The withdrawal of the trustmark itself works as a powerful
sanction mechanism. The severity of such a sanction as well as the
credibility of its threat, however, depends on the success of the
trustmark provider: only if the trustmark has gained some weight
within the market place can its withdrawal pose a serious
competitive disadvantage to vendors. At the same time, only an
economically successful trustmark provider can afford to lose
vendors as clients. The success of trustmarks depends on three
decisive factors usually termed as 'critical mass, financial
sustainability, and branding' (Wagemans, 2003: 14). As mechanisms
of private ordering trustmarks are network goods by nature
(Aviram, 2003). This is the reason why international cooperation
between trustmark schemes and both the interlinking with (eg,
market places, ADR) and the embedding in already existing
mechanisms of self-regulation (eg, Chamber of Commerce) seems
particularly apposite.

10
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C. ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The notion that the Internet's communicative potential can be used
to establish alternative forms of dispute resolution procedures
dates back to the mid-1990s (Post, 1995; Karamon, 1996: 537; Cona,
1997: 975; Eisen, 1998: 1305; Almaguer and Baggot, 1998: 711;
Bordone, 1998: 175; Perritt, 2000: 675). The term 'online dispute
resolution' (ODR) covers on the one hand conflicts arising from the
use of the Internet itself, such as disputes over domain names or ecommerce transactions, on the other hand services of alternative
dispute resolution provided via the Internet (eADR) (Hörnle, 2001;
Teitz, 2001: 990; Schultz, 2004: 71; Ponte, 2004). The latter includes
the whole range of traditional ADR procedures - informal assisted
negotiation, mediation, and formal arbitration - in so far as the
involved parties and a neutral third party communicate via email
or via password protected web pages, they electronically exchange
documents and photographs ('written proceedings'), and they even
negotiate simultaneously in chat-rooms, via phone or in
videoconferences ('quasi hearings') (Krause, 2001: 457, 460). The
kind and extent of the use of information and communication
technology not only depends on its spread among potential users
but also on the aim and kind of dispute resolution procedure.
When, for example, in international commercial arbitration the
formal requirements of the 1958 New York Convention are of
concern, high technical standards are necessary, while in more
informal dispute resolution procedures easily accessible, timely
and inexpensive solutions are required (Hörnle, 2003).
Moreover, software supported negotiation systems allow parties to
settle disputes without involvement of a neutral third party
(Lodder and Thiessen, 2003). Thus, based on game theoretical
premises automatic negotiation systems are offered for those
conflicts in which solely the amount of a sum is disputed, such as in
insurance cases. Within a 'blind bidding'-procedure, the parties
submit their offer for a settlement within a number of rounds; yet,
their offer remains unknown to the opposite party. Then, computer

2007]

TRANSNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW

11

software fixes a binding sum for the settlement based on the
arithmetic mean of all offers and given that the final sum remains
within a certain range, eg, a difference of 30 percent (see the survey
of providers in Tyler and Bretherton, 2003). Besides, systems exist
that provide parties with a password-protected space for
negotiation. Via menu-driven input masks, they allow parties to
closer define the object of dispute, to fix their aims, to deduce the
willingness to compromise and to reach voluntary settlement by
standardized information about possible ways to resolution.10
Hence, ODR can be distinguished from more traditional
procedures of ADR in that technology takes part as a 'fourth party'
(Katsh and Rifkin, 2001: 93; Lodder and Thiessen, 2003).
A study by the Australian ministry of justice dating back to 2003
examined 76 ODR web pages worldwide; 42 of which were
established in the years 1999/2000 and 19 of which had already
ceased to provide their services (Tyler and Bretherton, 2003: 5;
updated Tyler, 2004). Only 24 providers submitted information
concerning the number of cases dealt with, only eight web pages
contained statistical information about achieved results (Tyler and
Bretherton, 2003: 9). One can assume that those providers that did
not present any information were not particularly successful
(Schultz, Kaufmann-Kohler, Langer, and Bonnet, 2001: 67;
Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004). Among the more successful
providers are especially those ODR pages which are linked to a
market place for e-commerce or which are run by a Chamber of
Commerce or an industry association. The reason for such success
may lie in the fact that those pages are easily accessible via the
market place or the vendor's web page, that they are partly
advertised by a trustmark and that they can be used for free or for a
minimal charge due to subsidies by the operators of market places
and by subscription (Tyler and Bretherton, 2003: 11).

10

For www.smartsettle.com's offer see Lodder and Thiessen, 2003: 5.
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In the following, I introduce the most successful ODR model in the
area of b2c-e-commerce (cf. Hörnle, 2002). 'SquareTrade' is a private
company with its headquarters in San Francisco. Since February
2000, it has dealt with over one million conflicts linked to 120
countries in five languages. This renders 'SquareTrade' market
leader for those ODR services dealing with transactions at
electronic market places.11 The dispute resolution procedure is
arranged in two phases. At the first level, direct negotiations
between the involved parties take place via a secure web page.
Communication is organized via interactive input masks, which are
constantly revised and improved in the face of new experiences
(software facilitated direct negotiations). In a majority of cases, the
involved parties come to a settlement themselves. If this cannot be
achieved, each party can call in a mediator at the second level of the
procedure. Based on electronic documentation, the mediator is able
to quickly gain an overview of the conflict and to support the
parties in their quest for a settlement. Following the party's request,
she can even make a non-binding suggestion for a settlement
(online mediation). Overall, 80 percent of cases can be resolved by a
conjoint settlement, which is obeyed in 98 percent of cases. The
average duration of a procedure is two weeks.
Based on a cooperation agreement with 'eBay', for 'eBay'-members
direct negotiations at 'SquareTrade' are free of charge; the
involvement of a mediator is only 20 US dollars. The 'SquareTrade'ODR service is easily accessible via links at the 'eBay'-web page.
Furthermore, for an annual charge 'SquareTrade' offers a trustmark
that vendors can bear given that their identity and reliability has
been established by 'SquareTrade' and that they subscribe to the
'SquareTrade Selling and Customer Services Standards', which
especially demand compromise oriented participation in
'SquareTrade'-ODR procedures as well as strict compliance with

For the offer of www.squaretrade.com see the presentation of its
President & CEO (Abernethy, 2003).

11
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settlements achieved there. The high levels of settlement and
compliance achieved within 'eBay' can be explained by the
impending withdrawal of the trustmark and deterioration of 'eBay'ratings. As 'eBay'-vendors heavily rely on their reputation via
'SquareTrade' they can also render (unjustified) negative customer
ratings objects of dispute. If both parties agree to withdraw a
negative rating within the 'SquareTrade'-procedure, the rating is
not erased from the 'eBay'-member profile, yet it does not remain
part of the 'PowerSeller'-rating, the highest category of which
requires 98 percent of positive ratings.
One can record that the success of ODR procedures depends not
only on the provision of easy accessible, quick, effective and lowcost dispute resolution, but as well on linkages with heavily used
market places and with other services providing private order. The
example of 'SquareTrade' proves that cost-effective ODR
procedures—even covering cross-border transactions—can be
organized and are affordable for low volume mass market
transactions. 'SquareTrade' has succeeded in integrating its offer to
the primary markets for e-commerce, where online disputes evolve.
This integration is brought about by a cooperation agreement with
the primary market maker 'eBay', and by creating socio-legal bonds
for potential dispute parties to commit to the process.12 The
'SquareTrade' mediation process is mandatory to those eBaysellers, which committed to the trustmark scheme. In addition, the
commitment of parties to the process is streamlined by the
potential repercussions with the eBay feedback system.

The term 'legal bond' being used in a very broad sense, including not
only contractual design but also all kinds of 'private ordering' (see Mifsud
Bonnici and de Vey Mestdagh, 2005: 31-42).
12

14

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 03

D. METHOD OF PAYMENT AND CREDIT SECURITY
In the context of private ordering in e-commerce, the role of
payment service providers as trusted third parties is of interest. From
international commerce it is known that mechanisms such as letters
of credit, factoring, forfeiting and credit insurance play a major role
in the cushioning of those risks arising out of the consecutive
exchange of goods and services (Häberle, 2002). In b2c-e-commerce
a number of models have been developed which facilitate
consumers to carry the burden of the usually required advance
payments. These are introduced in the following. More advanced
'real time e-payment'-technologies aiming at the simultaneous
exchange of services and payments in direct e-commerce with
digitized goods remain very much in the future.13
In b2c-e-commerce payment by credit card is most common
(Federal Trade Commission, 2003; cf. OECD, 2006b).14 Against
widespread fear concerning credit card fraud on the Internet, for
consumers this method of payment is the most secure as payments
in e-commerce requires credit card number and period of validity
but no signature of the credit card holder.15 Hence, consumers can
object to transactions with the bank issuing their credit card within
six weeks after receipt of the credit card statement. According to
the so-called 'credit card charge back'-procedure, the vendor has to

For the transfer of a 'delivery vs. payment'-system, well-known from
stock market clearings, to b2c-e-commerce see European Central Bank, 2004.
14
Visa is used more often than any other card regarding online shopping,
see: http://www.visaeurope.com/personal/onlineshopping/main.jsp
15
Cf. for the German legal situation Meder, 2002. Implementing Art. 8
Distant Selling Directive (97/7/EC), § 676 h BGB only provides a clarification. In
praxis the allocation of the burden of proof is decisive. Apart from a given
signature, prima facie evidence—that the consumer has handled the transaction
herself or has not carefully treated his PIN—only exists in the case of the PINprocedure, see the German ‘Bundesgerichtshof’, Judgement of 5 October 2004 (XI
ZR 210/03): http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20040285.htm
13
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prove that the payment has taken place with consent of the credit
card holder. Due to the lack of the consumer's signature, this can
only be successful if the vendor can prove that he has delivered
goods to the consumer and that the consumer has indeed ordered
these goods. Failing such proof, eg because the consumer claims
not to have taken the order, the paid purchase price is refunded
and the vendor is subject to a hefty charge. In this way, banks have
completely passed on the risks of online fraud to online vendors.
Yet, due to possible abuse through unjustified complaints, in the
meantime online vendors have been offered rating systems for
credit card customers in order to identify in advance those
consumers marked by numerous charge backs. Somewhat
misleadingly termed as consumer protection, yet indeed probably
more used to protect vendors, Visa now offers 'Verified by Visa', a
system that provides registered customers with an additional
password and which allows identifying the customer via a secure
'Visa'-server. Hence, customers cannot claim anymore that they
have not ordered a particular good or service.16
In the debate on self-regulation in b2c-e-commerce, credit card
issuers have early been discussed as playing an important role in
providing effective redress to consumers, since via the 'charge
back'-procedure they could enforce decisions issued by ODR
service providers (Perritt, 2000; ABA, 2002). Yet, this would mean
that credit card suppliers either provide fair ODR procedures
themselves or cooperate with an established ODR provider in this
respect, neither of which is the case. In fact, current 'charge back'procedures are relatively unfair since vendors are unlikely to
succeed in a complaints procedure given the form of evidence
necessary plus they have to carry high costs. Moreover, a fair
'charge back'-procedure should not only cover the absence of card

16

http://www.visaeurope.com/merchant/handlingvisapayments/cardnotpresent
/verifiedbyvisa.jsp
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holder authorisation ('I did not do it') but also include other
frequently raised complaints, such as 'I did not receive it', 'item not
as described', 'item defective', as well as the refund of the purchase
price in case of withdrawal and return. In this regard, however, the
legal situation differs from country to country: whereas such
complaints are ruled out in France, consumers in the US enjoy such
rights under the 'Fair Credit Billing Act'. In other countries, the
right to complain is stipulated by credit card agreements with the
issuing bank; hence, it remains at the bank's discretion whether it
further pursues complaints, which are foreseen in the international
'charge back'-rules of credit card issuers (European Commission,
2000; OECD, 2006b: 19). Finally, the credit card system is unsuitable
for small value transactions due to its tariff scale.
'E-payment'-service providers like 'PayPal' take advantage of this
gap.17 'PayPal' offers to its 56 million users a system of payment
that allows transferring money to people in 45 countries provided
they have an email address. The system requires opening a
password protected 'PayPal'-account, to which money can be
transferred or for which a direct debit agreement can be authorized.
In a protected procedure money can then be transferred via email.
The transferred amount is credited to the recipient's 'PayPal'account, which can be opened free of charge even after receipt of
the email transfer. Credit can be transferred to a bank account at
every time. This standard service is for both parties free of charge,
yet there is no pay of interest on credit. 'PayPal' offers special
accounts for companies that allow accepting credit card payments
via 'PayPal', even if the vendor does not participate in the credit
card system. Since 'PayPal' has been acquired by 'eBay' in 2002,
'PayPal' offers a special service for 'eBay'-auctions. For 'eBay'buyers, who pay via 'PayPal', a money-back guarantee takes effect
in cases where goods are 'not received or significantly not as

17

www.paypal.com
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described' up to a value of 1,000 US dollars; for transactions not
covered, 'PayPal' provides a 'Buyer Complaint Process' in order to
solve complaints. Additionally, 'PayPal' offers support for
companies both in averting 'credit card charge backs' and by
providing a 'seller protection policy', which covers losses up to
5,000 US dollars provided that the vendor carefully follows
particular standards. In the context of settling disputed
transactions, 'PayPal' follows a rigid policy of freezing affected
credit. Together with 'PayPal's' partly limited attainability, this has
led to criticism from companies and customers alike.18
Finally, comparable to a letter of credit 'Escrow.com' offers an
online escrow service, the use of which is recommended to
customers by 'eBay' for transactions involving higher sums and
unknown contractual partners.19 At first, buyer and seller register
via 'Escrow.com's' protected web page and then have to specify
their terms of trade, among those a detailed description of the
merchandize, of its price, of the method and insurance of delivery,
of the way to carry costs and of the period in which the buyer has
the right to return the good. Then the buyer deposits the purchase
price in an escrow account, 'Escrow.com' informs the vendor about
payment receipt, which causes the vendor to dispatch the ordered
good in a way that allows proof of delivery (eg, UPS). If the time
allowed returning the good passes without the buyer's complaint,
the purchase price is paid out to the vendor. In case the buyer does
not want to keep the good, she returns it and gets back the
purchase price (less 0.85 percent as escrow charge) and dispatch
costs according to previous agreement, provided that within a

See the critical web pages www.paypalsucks.com and
www.paypalwarning.com where vendors complain that 'PayPal' would
deliberately delay complaints for months in order to benefit from the interest for
blocked credits. Whereas consumers claim that PayPal would like to withdraw
their right to the 'credit card charge back'-procedure.
19
www.escrow.com; see also the 'Safe Trade program' by www.iloxx.de.
18
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specified period the vendor has not objected to the return of the
good. In the latter case, the purchase price remains with
'Escrow.com' without interest pay until buyer and seller have come
to a mutual agreement. According to 'Escrow.com's' terms of trade,
after 60 days the matter is passed on to the 'American Arbitration
Association' (AAA) in order to come to a binding decision. In the
meantime, the involved parties are free to turn, for instance, to
'SquareTrade' in order to find an amicable solution, yet
'Escrow.com' does not provide any binding rules concerning this
procedure.

III. CONSUMER PROTECTING CIVIL REGIMES: THE
ROLE OF VIRTUAL MARKET PLACES
The above survey of self-regulation in the global electronic market
place has demonstrated that mechanisms of contractual governance
ranging from reputation and the involvement of trustworthy third
parties as intermediaries to alternative dispute resolution - all of
which are well known from the debates on private ordering in
international commerce - have been refined and adapted in order to
be used as well in the field of b2c-e-commerce; here commercial
providers of ordering services have especially been successful. Yet,
each of the introduced services alone leaves a number of problems
unattended. If problems arise after a transaction was entered into, it
is hardly of use that the contractual partner has carefully been
chosen on the basis of his reputation according to an individual
rating system or her participation in a trustmark scheme. The
handling of payments by an escrow service leads to no solution eg
in case of a disputed withdrawal, where it remains unclear in
which procedure the dispute should be settled. For often after
dispute has arisen, the involved parties are unable to agree on a
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particular procedure.20 Similarly, an ODR procedure is of no use, if
its result is not implemented by the involved parties due to the
impending loss of reputation or with the help of a payment service.
Opportunistic behaviour can occur not only in the parties' direct
contractual relationship, but also in the context of private ordering
services offered by third parties. Eg a vendor might not only fail to
perform as contractually promised, but he might in addition fail to
respond to a claim brought in an ODR procedure, or he might fail
to abide to a mutual agreement found in such ODR procedure.
However, the efficacy of private ordering can be enhanced by
combining different governance mechanisms, especially if it is
agreed upon in advance which authority to turn to in case of a
dispute and if the parties' use of ODR procedures can be linked
back to online reputation systems on the primary markets.
Negative ratings are then not only given to sellers who deliver lowquality goods or to buyers who fail to pay, but also to those who
behave uncooperatively in mediation, who do not follow
settlements agreed on, or who evade an ongoing ODR procedure of
an 'e-payment' provider via a parallel 'credit card charge back', etc.
In international commerce, the necessary interlinking of different
private ordering services regularly occurs in relation to an
individual transaction. Of course one can find standardized
contract clauses such as the 'Incoterms' of the International

See a Statement of the General Counsel of the American Arbitration
Association, Ms. Peterson, available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65871.000/hju65871_0.H
TM: 'About 95 percent of the arbitrations that come to the Association result from
pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Our 75 years of experience indicates that at the
time a dispute arises people can't agree on anything. … So the choice before this
committee is not pre-dispute or post-dispute, it is pre-dispute or litigation,
because our experience shows that post-dispute arbitration is something that
people won't agree to.'; the same is reported by the CEO of 'SquareTrade'
(Abernethy, 2003: 8).
20
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Chamber of Commerce, standard forms for different arrangements
concerning letters of credit, and model arbitration clauses
referencing the rules of certain arbitration institutions. Yet these are
individually tailored by international law firms into a contractual
regime as complete as possible. In consumer markets, in turn, there
is a higher need for standardisation, which is usually satisfied by
companies' general business terms. Due to their unilateral
imposition on customers, however, such terms and conditions are
hardly suitable to achieve a satisfactory level of consumer
protection. In the domestic context, this is the rationale of state
intervention through coercive consumer protection laws and
judicial review. Similarly, in global b2c-e-commerce there exists a
demand for a neutral third party that could standardize private
ordering services and tie them into effective civil regimes.
In this context, operators of virtual market places perform an
important function. For even more than medieval harbours, fairs
and market places, operators of electronic market places stand in
international competition for suppliers and consumers. In order to
attract turnover, it is not only necessary to provide efficient
technical infrastructure, but also to establish a 'safe harbour'-policy,
which strengthens the trust of potential customers into the fairness
of transactions handled at the market place. As international stock
markets offer additional services for the handling of transactions
(clearing) and try to establish standards of transparency and
investor protection transcending legal minimum requirements,
(Adolff, 2003: 61-91; Damrau, 2003) operators of virtual market
places make an effort to establish a market order that both fosters
consumer trust and satisfies the needs of small and medium
enterprises.
Founded 1995 in California, 'eBay' has developed from an
electronic advertisement section via a platform for online auctions
into the currently most popular site for Internet business between
costumers and especially small businesses. It encompasses more
than 100 million registered users throughout the world and 24
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localized web pages ('the world's online marketplace').21 In order to
increase the attractiveness of the market place, 'eBay' fosters the
public spirit among its users, which leads to the emergence of a
private market order.22 As a virtual market place is a network good,
the benefit of which increases with the number of participants, the
level of regulation has only slowly been increased reflecting
costumers' needs and numbers (Baron, 2002). As already presented,
the core of this market order is a rating system, which has been
developed further by the introduction of star ratings and trust
symbols. Through cooperation with the ODR provider
'SquareTrade' and escrow services23 as well as the buying up of the
payment service provider 'PayPal', it has been embedded in a
network of private services providing order.24 As an additional
service 'eBay' offers security tips to buyers and sellers with special
attention given to international transactions.25
'eBay's' market order is based on the 'user agreement' and a number
of additional 'policies', which regulate the behaviour of members at

21

http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/thecompany/companyoverview.ht
ml: Currently, ‘with millions of buyers and sellers worldwide, eBay offers
localized sites in the following markets’: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. ‘In addition, eBay has a presence in Latin America through its investment
MercadoLibre.com.’
22
http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/community.html
23
Eg eBay Germany cooperates with the escrow service 'iloxx Safetrade':
www.iloxx.de.
24
http://pages.ebay.com/securitycenter/
25

http://offer.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?GlobalTradeHub&hubType=0
.
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the market place and their relationship with 'eBay' itself.26 These
detailed rules are centrally laid down by 'eBay', yet they root in
closely observed customer habits at the market place. They are
constantly revised both in exchange with members of 'eBay'-fora
and as reaction to arising issues becoming evident through the
offered protection programs for buyers and sellers. 'SquareTrade'
also contributes to norm development at the market place.
Although 'SquareTrade'-mediators issue no rulings the ratio
decidendi of which could work as foundation for a precedent, they
do not act arbitrarily but on the basis of those experiences gained in
handling countless 'eBay'-disputes. From these standardized
solutions for repeated conflicts, certain patterns develop that
'SquareTrade' includes in its menu-driven software for direct
negotiations between parties (Abernethy, 2003: 5). As sanction for
norm violations, the online reputation mechanism is available
(informal third-party-control). This mechanism is fostered by 'eBay'
via the introduction of a new option for sellers: 'buyerrequirements'.27 Accordingly, buyers can be excluded who have a
negative assessment, frequent 'item not paid'-warnings28 or no
'PayPal'-account.29 On the other hand, 'eBay' itself has the
possibility of punishing violations of the market order by imposing

http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies: 1. Rules for Buyers, 2. Rules for
Sellers, 3. Rules for Everyone, 4. Prohibited and Restricted Items, 5. Rules about
Intellectual Property, 6. Feedback, 7. Privacy, 8. Identity.
27
As eBay rules provide for the binding nature of an offer (see
Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Decision of 14 December 2000 (2 U 58/00), Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2001: 1142; Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 7
November 2001 (VIII ZR 13/01), NJW 2002: 363; summarised also at
http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~Lorenz/urteile/njw02_363.htm), thus far sellers
have not been able to select their buyer.
28
http://pages.ebay.de/help/tp/unpaid-item-process.html
29
http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/buyer-requirements.html
26
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sanctions: from warnings, the temporary freezing of an account to
the exclusion of an involved member (formal third-party-control).30
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the literature
refers to the regime established by 'eBay' as an autonomous legal
order (Katsh, Rifkin and Gaitenby, 2000: 705; Baron, 2002; Schultz,
2005: 27). Although the market place is not located outside the
state's legal order—especially in Germany numerous judgments
concerning 'eBay'-transactions have been passed31—courts can only
partially and indirectly impact on 'eBay's' market order. Recently,
the German Federal Supreme Court (the 'Bundesgerichtshof')
decided that in the context of 'eBay'-auctions consumers have a
right of withdrawal as 'eBay'-auctions are no auctions according to
section 156 German civil code (the 'BGB'), ie the exception of
section 312d sec. 4 no. 5 BGB cannot be applied.32 According to
sections 312d and 355 BGB, the unfounded cancellation of a
contract is possible at every time even before the dispatch of a
good; this contradicts the main 'eBay'-principle for buyers, which
holds that a purchased good generally has to be paid and that an
unpaid good principally leads to a warning to the buyer due to his
lack of reliability—all this independently of a right of withdrawal
granted by the seller.33 Admittedly, 'eBay' cautions no buyer for

See § 4 of the user agreement of eBay Germany:
http://pages.ebay.de/help/policies/user-agreement.html?ssPageName=f:f:DE
31
An up to date collection of verdicts, including many full texts, can be
found under: http://www.internetrecht-rostock.de/ebay-undinternetauktionen.htm.
32
Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 3 November 2004 (VIII ZR 375/03),
JurPC Web-Dok. 281/2004: http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20040281.htm; with
critical remarks Janal, 2005; critical also Spindler, 2005.
33
§ 9 of the terms of trade of eBay.de:
http://pages.ebay.de/help/policies/user-agreement.html?ssPageName=f:f:DE;
see as well: http://pages.ebay.de/help/policies/unpaid-item-process.html.
Interestingly, the Amtsgericht Bremen, Decision of 20 October 2005 (16 C
168/O5), recently ruled, that a contractual penalty clause applying in case of an
unwarranted exercise of a right to rescission (ie item not paid) is not an unfair
30
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exercising her right of withdrawal; yet, the latter's immanent
possibility of misuse by its frequent and arbitrary exercise—
producing high costs for vendors and 'eBay' due to the necessary
refund of fees for commission and offer—can be tamed via negative
feed back of the 'eBay'-community. Otherwise, the effect of the
judgment remains limited to those cases in which German law is
applicable. Concerning cross-border transactions, German
consumers can refer to the BGH, yet they might find hardly any
understanding from the international 'eBay'-community for a
behaviour that jeopardizes the economic rationale and attraction of
online auctions and which consequently questions the market order
fundamentally. In the case of withdrawing an order from an
American seller, the eBay-'private legal system' might hardly help a
German consumer to get a refund.

IV. CIVIL CONSTITUTION: REFLEXIVE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW
Civil regimes protecting consumers in the field of global ecommerce have become independent from the legal order of states
by linking private rule making (codes of conduct) with alternative
dispute resolution procedures (ODR) and mechanisms of socioeconomic sanctioning (reputation, loss of trustmark, exclusion) and
enforcement (money-back guarantee, charge back). Since a complex
variety of such regimes has emerged, we can draw the picture of a
competition among civil regimes, in which different providers of
private order compete for the trust of vendors and consumers alike.
With regard to the substantive consumer protection standards
applied by such regimes, the 'Alternative Dispute Resolution
Guidelines' agreed on by the 'Global Business Dialogue on

business term under the European unfair contract terms directive (93/13/EEC).
Thus, a buyer who refused to pay for a car he purchased by an auction on eBay
was ordered to pay damages: http://www.internetrechtrostock.de/ebayurteil29.htm.
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Electronic Commerce' (GBDe) and 'Consumers International' in
November 2003 read:
'Applicable Rules: One of the principal reasons why
business, consumers and governments consider the
development of ADR systems to be of such strategic
importance for the enhancement of consumer trust in
electronic commerce is that such systems can settle
disputes in an adequate fashion without necessarily
engaging in cumbersome, costly, and difficult research
on the detailed legal rules that would have to be applied
in an official court procedure. […] ADR dispute
resolution officers may decide in equity and/or on the basis of
codes of conduct. This flexibility as regards the grounds for
ADR decisions provides an opportunity for the
development of high standards of consumer protection
worldwide.' (GBDe, 2003: 59)
Accompanying the thus described privatisation of consumer
contract law, the issue is that consumer contracts are triangularized
because providers of private order place themselves as 'neutral
third party' in-between companies and the consumer, which
renders the latter not only a recipient of goods but also a consumer
of private legal services (for the arising trinity of potential contractual
relationships see Hacke, 2001: 31). Here, we deal with reflexive
consumer contract law in so far as those procedural conditions are
concerned which render the private generation of substantial
consumer contract law as fair. The thesis put forward here is that
the establishment of effective consumer protecting civil regimes
will factually displace state consumer contract law in particular
areas of e-commerce, especially in formally organized virtual
market places. This is why the emerging transnational consumer
contract law requires an embedding in a procedural constitution of
freedom, which at the same time enables the privatisation of civil law
and adds the necessary civilisation to private law.
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In this respect, the necessary constitutionalization of consumer
protecting civil regimes has to distinguish between an interior and
an exterior constitution: the emergence of transnational consumer
contract law as a legal system is, on the one hand, characterized by
reflexivity, ie the application of a process to itself (eg, making norms
on the making of norms, arbitrating over arbitration, self-regulation
of self-regulation, etc.); hence, societal self-organisation constitutes
an interior spontaneous constitution of private regimes quasi by itself
(see Teubner, 2004). On the other hand, private regimes require
embedding in a public framework that facilitates societal selforganisation as an exercise of party autonomy and at the same time
limits it with respect to third party interests and public policy. Here
the phenomena of normative reflexivity entrenched in private
regimes as well as their public framework work as mutually
compensatory constitutional orders. In the context of global
governance, this renders their boundaries fuzzy. Encompassing the
collaboration of state, industry, and civil society actors, they appear
as a hybrid order, (Engel, 2001: 569) which shall be termed as civil
constitution.
The establishment of a global civil constitution for transnational
consumer contract law mainly concerns the justification of reflexive
institutions, which organize the described phenomena of selfregulation and private ordering in a way that, on the one hand,
fosters effective redress through alternative mechanisms of
consumer protection and, on the other hand, guarantees the
fairness and justice of such procedures towards consumers and
businesses. In the following, different approaches for the
constitutionalization of consumer protecting civil regimes are
introduced. Although both aspects cannot be sharply
distinguished, the focus is on the substantial contract law (rights)
(1) and on the procedural aspects of consumer law (remedies) (2).
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Trustmarks are awarded on the basis of a catalogue of criteria
regularly consolidated in a code of conduct. For the Internet and ecommerce a plethora of trustmarks is available which on the basis
of different criteria aim at enhancing the protection of consumers,
children, and privacy or any combination of these. While, on the
one hand, it is claimed that the best trustmarks prevail due to the
invisible hand of competition, it is, on the other hand, feared that
due to the wide variety of offers consumers could lose overview
and, hence, that the general trust into the industry could vanish.34
Certainly, a sound regulatory competition between different
trustmark schemes only works if consumers are not misled by
trustmark providers, who apply inferior standards which are not
sufficiently monitored.
In order to increase the transparency in the field of trustmarks, the
notion has emerged that quality requirements should be developed
in collaboration of states, industry, and consumer associations
(Nordquist, Andersson and Dzepina, 2002). In so far as the
compliance with minimum requirements established by coregulation is here rewarded with the award of a secondary
trustmark (trustmark of trustmarks), we deal with a reflexive form of
self-regulation, which even regulates the conditions for its own
possibility via self-regulation. Initial approaches to such civil
constitutions have first been developed at the national level (a).
From here they can be linked to supranational (b) and global civil
constitutions (c) via cooperation.

For this and the following cf. the report of the Irish EU-Presidency
presented at the European Consumer Day 2004 Conference 'Building Consumer
Confidence in the European Online Marketplace, Dublin Castle, 15th March
2004', p. 8, available at:
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st09/st09466.en04.pdf

34
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1. SECONDARY TRUSTMARKS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
On suggestion of the British government, the 'Alliance for
Electronic Business' has in collaboration with the 'Consumers'
Association' founded a consumer protection initiative in the field of
self-regulation in e-commerce in 1999. Its aim was to fix minimum
standards in the face of the proliferation of trustmark programs.35
For it, the non-profit organisation 'TrustUK' has been set up, the
board of which consists of representatives of the Chambers of
Commerce and of consumer associations. 'TrustUK' established its
own trustmark, which is however not directly awarded to vendors.
As most companies are member of a Chamber of Commerce or of
an association that binds its members to a code of practice, these
'code owners' are granted the license for the distribution of the
trustmark given that their members' codes are in accordance with
'TrustUK's' minimum requirements. Participating vendors bear
either the 'TrustUK' label alone or together with the trustmark of
the 'code owner'; if issues arise consumers have to contact the 'code
owner' directly. Only if the consumer claims that the latter has not
settled a dispute in accordance with 'TrustUK's' guidelines, there is
the possibility to turn to 'TrustUK' directly. Currently, four 'code
owners' are accredited to 'TrustUK' covering more than 4,000 web
traders.
The German initiative 'D21' is a network of political parties,
enterprises, associations and other institutions ('public private
partnership'). Its aim is to improve the main conditions for
Germany to quickly and successfully transit into the information
and knowledge society.36 In July 2002 members of the initiative
have agreed on the D21 quality criteria for Internet offers ('D21Qualitätskriterien für Internet-Angebote'), which—as amended in

35
36

www.trustuk.org.uk
www.initiatived21.de
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200537—put the OECD Guidelines on the basis of European and
German law in concrete terms; furthermore, the criteria explain and
amend the latter. Currently, the initiative D21 recommends five
trustmarks meeting its quality criteria.38 The monitoring and
further development of these criteria have been transferred to a
trustmark monitoring board, which apart from representatives of
participating companies consists of each a representative of the
ministry of economic affairs, of the federal data protection office
and
of
a
consumer
association
('Verbraucherzentrale
Bundesverband e.V.') (Föhlisch, 2004). However, such initiatives at
the national level enhance the transparency of the trustmark market
to a certain extent, yet due to their gearing to national law they do
not contribute much to solving issues of cross-border consumer
contracts (see also Nordquist, Andersson and Dzepina, 2002).
2. SUPRANATIONAL STANDARDISATION VIA CO-REGULATION?
With regard to cross-border situations inside the European internal
market, the question which Member State’s consumer protection
standards shall apply, in principle, could be answered easily as the
minimum standards of consumer contract law are established in
the European acquis communautaire, ie a variety of EC Directives.
Yet, attempts by the European Commission to unify the contract
law of the Member States have failed so far, often due to the
resistance of consumer associations and national governments
which agreed on a minimum harmonisation of consumer rights,
but prevented the necessary combination of such measures with
the 'country of origin'-principle (see also Calliess, 2003). Hence, one

Updated version: http://www.internetguetesiegel.de/docs/D21_Qualitaetskriterien_2005.pdf
38
www.internet-guetesiegel.de: Apart from Trusted Shops and among
others, Euro-Label Deutschland of the EHI (www.shopinfo.net) and S@ferShopping (www.safer-shopping.de) run by the TÜV Süd are part of this
initiative.
37
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could ask whether it would not be a viable alternative to statecontrolled legal harmonisation to generate substantive 'Principles
of European Consumer Contracts' via self-regulation, for instance
by developing Europe-wide recommended general contract terms
(European Commission, 2003: 21 ff., at 4.2), or relating specifically
to b2c-e-commerce by elaborating a European code of conduct
which could be applied in cross-border ADR-procedures as
institutionalized in the EEJ-NET.39
The European Commission, indeed, aims at such a project in the
frame of its 'e-confidence' initiative. In its action plan concerning
'eEurope 2005', the following aims are introduced:
'Trust and confidence. By end 2003, the Commission,
together with the private sector, consumer organisations
and Member States will examine possibilities of
establishing a European-wide online dispute resolution
system. To facilitate cross-border electronic transactions
for SMEs, the Commission will further support the
establishment of online information systems on legal
issues. The Commission will work with stakeholders on
trustmarks requirements with a view to a
recommendation on consumer confidence in electronic
commerce.' (European Commission, 2002a: 15)
In order to prepare such a recommendation, the Commission has
established an 'e-confidence forum' at the Joint Research Center in
the year 2000. In this context, a 'drafting group' comprising
members of industry and consumer associations has drawn up
'principles for e-commerce codes of conduct'.40 On this basis, the
European industrial and consumer associations UNICE and BEUC

See:
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/eej_net/index_en.htm
40
On file with author.
39
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have agreed on 'European trustmark requirements' (ETR). For their
implementation, a committee of association members shall be
established and an 'e-confidence' web page shall be set up.
Providers of trustmarks, who want to join this portal, have to pass
an annual assessment of their compliance with the ETR through an
independent third party (eg, auditors) (see BEUC/UNICE, 2001).
Since announcement of the program in October 2001, there have,
however, been no recognisable steps towards the establishment of
the system. In November 2004, the Commission finally accepted the
failure of the initiative and blamed the industry for a lack of
interest in the implementation of the ETR, especially with regard to
the financing (see European Commission, 2004). This lack of
interest may root in the fact that the ETR have been developed by
association officials who stand more for a traditional industrial
society than a modern information society. In addition, it remains
unclear how the ETR could contribute to the problems of crossborder b2c-e-commerce. In this respect the ETR approach—praised
by the Commission—is aiming for a race to the top:
'The ETR offer a basis for good online practice. They do
not seek to override or replace any mandatory provisions
at European level. They are supplementary to legal
obligations and do not affect consumers' statutory rights.'
(BEUC/UNICE, 2001: 5)41
In this respect, the ETR accord with consumerists, who demand
that soft law generated in the process of self-legislation should only
lead to an increase in the level of protection, but under no
circumstances to a softening or evasion of those obligatory
consumer protection regulations in place in a consumer's home

Appraisal of the European Commission, 2004: 9: 'The Commission
Services are of the view that codes such as the ETR are most useful if they
contain provisions that set an even higher standard of consumer protection than
the protection offered by legislation.’

41
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country (European Consumer Law Group, 2001). Yet, as the ETR
refers to nationally applicable law in almost all important points,
they appear strangely anaemic and do neither guide SMEs to those
regulations they should adopt for Europe-wide sales nor do they
work as standard for ADR-decisions in consequential conflicts. For
the problem of EU-wide cross-border b2c-e-commerce is to have
uniform legal standards which provide the necessary certainty, and
not just another code like the ETR which merely adds to the
existing regulatory chaos. One can suspect that the protagonists
involved with the ETR are too close to the European legislative
process which does prevent the 'e-confidence' initiative to become
an independent stimulus for the generation of certainty of the law
and justice in the internal market.
At the European level, the 'Euro-Label' system however provides a
functioning alternative, which has been established due to an
initiative of the trade association 'EuroCommerce' in 2002.42 'EuroLabel' is a network of national trustmark providers from Austria,
Germany, France, Spain, Poland and Italy that awards trustmarks
on the basis of a common European code of conduct via cobranding. 'Euro-Label' also handles cross-border complaints against
its 429 certified shops. If in this way issues cannot be resolved, the
consumer is referred to the EEJ-Net. The 'European code of
conduct' is relatively detailed; instead of sweeping references to
nationally applicable law, it details the concrete rules of the acquis
communautaire. Concerning withdrawals, for instance, it repeats the
EU directive on distance contracts, which states that the
withdrawal period has to be at least seven working days, does not
commence before prior information and delivery and ceases after
three months at latest. Certification, though, happens by national
authorities according to local standards. It cannot be overseen
whether the European Codex will be of crucial importance beyond

42

www.euro-label.com
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its function as minimum standard for participating national
trustmark providers, for instance in the arbitration of cross-border
disputes. Its wording, however, would render it more apposite
than the ETR.
3. GLOBAL LINKAGE
Already in 2001, the 'Global Business Dialogue on E-Commerce'
(GBDe) published recommendations concerning trustmarks,
including both guidelines for trustmark providers and minimum
standards for the codes of conduct applicable to their online traders
(GBDe, 2001). Also in 2001, the European umbrella organisation of
the Chambers of Commerce 'Eurochambres', the mail order firm
'FEDMA' and the US-American 'BBBOnline' launched the 'Global
Trustmark Alliance' (GTA) as a common initiative in order to
further develop and implement global standards. Its aim is to unite
national and regional trustmark initiatives on the basis of common
minimum standards under the umbrella of the global GTA
trustmark, which is intended to be pursued as a co-branding
endeavour.43 In the meantime, the GTA membership has been
expanded especially by Asian organisations and on the occasion of
the annual meeting of the GBDe in November 2004, an
organisational committee was installed and given the task of
preparing 'best practices' (GTA, 2004). Given the global reach of the
GTA initiative and based on OECD guidelines and the
recommendations of the GBDe, it can be expected that the
emerging code of conduct will set relevant standards for a
transnational consumer contract law.
The involved organisations also intend to cooperate in the handling
of cross-border disputes. A good example is the cooperation
agreement on mutual cooperation in cross-border e-commerce
complaints signed by 'ECOM ADR', a pilot project commissioned

43

See http://www.bbbonline.org/about/press/2001/042301.asp
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by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
and operated by Next Generation Electronic Commerce Promotion
Council of Japan (ECOM),44 and the US Better Business Bureau in
2002, where complaints from consumers in one country against an
e-trader situated in the other country are exchanged and both
organisations work together, if necessary assisting in language
problems. As of October 2004, 45 complaints from Japanese
consumers against US-based companies were forwarded from
ECOM-ADR to BBB-Online, and 22 of these disputes had been
settled. 12 disputes came to Japan in turn out of which only 2 could
be settled, while the other cases involved fraud, where eg
businesses turned out not to exist at all in Japan (Sawada, 2004).
Although ECOM ADR ceased its operations as of March 2006, the
quite impressing resolution rate of BBB-Online may be taken as an
outlook on how a seamless ODR-network for cross-border b2c-ecommerce might work in the future. Thus, similar cooperation
agreements have been implemented between 'BBBOnline' and
trustmark providers from the United Kingdom, which jointly
created a webpage for cross-border ADR,45 and more recently with
the Israel-based initiative Public Trust.46

B. LAW-CONSUMER PROTECTION: ODR STANDARDS
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

AND

Set down in Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 'right
to a fair trial' is the codification of the citizens' claim to jurisdiction
directly following from the ban on self-help. The Convention
frames this claim within the rule of law:

See: http://www.ecom.jp/adr/en/index.html; see as well as the outline
in (Sawada, 2004).
45
See: http://www.crossborderadr.org/
46
See: http://www.bbb.org/alerts/article.asp?ID=658
44
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In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
[…], everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be
pronounced publicly […].47
The inherent procedural guarantees are not only the kernel of the
European civil procedure, (Wolf, 2000) they also impact on
alternative arbitration procedures provided that those are binding
to the parties involved (Schiavetta, 2004). In this way, the European
Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that one can give up
one's right to access to court, yet such renunciation, for instance as
part of a arbitration clause, is only effective if it is voluntary and
explicitly expressed. Furthermore, by the judicial review of private
arbitration tribunals the state remains obliged to guarantee the core
of fundamental procedural rights, like the right to be heard, judicial
independence and procedural neutrality (cf. for the jurisdiction
Schiavetta, 2004). From the vantage point of ODR procedures in the
field of b2c-e-commerce, these principles are not only in force for
consumer arbitration in a narrow sense, they can also become
relevant on the side of companies as they set obligatory and
binding procedures, like those in the case of 'Online Confidence's'
arbitration procedure concerning amounts in dispute up to 5,000
Euro (see Schiavetta, 2004).
Yet, even if the parties' right to access to court is not limited in any
way, there is demand for principles concerning the transparency
and fairness of ODR procedures. Hence, companies, which have
contractually committed themselves to participate in an online
mediation procedure if demanded by a customer—like in the
trustmark programs of 'SquareTrade'—have to be informed in
advance about procedural conditions. In a similar way, the
'SquareTrade'-trustmark can only then enhance consumer trust in

47

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm
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e-commerce if the consumer is able to form an impression of the
course of the procedure and of whether it appears to be fair and
reasonable with respect to the neutrality of mediators, to costs, to
the promise for the implementation of negotiation results, etc. On
this matter, providers of ODR procedures can be subject to certain
pre-contractual obligations to inform customers (Ponte, 2002: 321).
In order to render the market for ODR services more transparent
and to establish certain minimum standards of fairness under
mentioned circumstances, different ODR service providers have (a)
suggested different measures in order to guarantee compliance
with these principles (b).
1. GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDERS OF ODR PROCEDURES
Initially one has to keep in mind that there exists a number of
principles for traditional ADR procedures in consumer affairs that
special guidelines for b2c-e-commerce can build upon: this includes
the 15 principles of the 'Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Consumer Disputes' of 1998. The AAA has made
compliance with these standards precondition for consumer
arbitration procedures (for the necessicity to adopt the protocol to
the Internet see Ponte, 2002a: 441); similarly, it is a precondition for
the participation in the 'EEJ-Net' to follow the European
Commission's recommendations concerning dispute settlement
(98/257/EG) and Mediation (2001/310/EG) in consumer affairs.48
A first outcome of the consultations on the European Commission’s
'Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Settlement in Civil and
Commercial Matters' (2002b) is the 'European Code of Conduct for
Mediators'49, which contains a number of ethical principles and

See:
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/adr_recommendations_e
n.htm
49
http://www.cto.int/adr/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.pdf
48
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which can be adopted by single mediators or institutional
providers of mediation procedures.
Based on extensive consultations, the 'Task Force on Electronic
Commerce and Alternative Dispute Resolution' of the 'American
Bar Association' (ABA) published 'Recommended Best Practices by
Online Dispute Resolution Service Providers' in September 2002.
These are meant as non-binding point of orientation for ODR
service providers, consumers and trustmark providers and suggest
that an ODR service provider informs its users about all fairness
relevant features of a procedure in a transparent way (ABA, 2002).
In November 2003 the 'Task Force on Consumer Policy for eBusiness' of the 'International Chamber of Commerce' (ICC) has
published 'Best Practices for Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) in
b2c and C2C transactions', which contain guidelines both for
enterprises handling b2c-e-commerce and for ODR service
providers (ICC, 2003). At the same time, the 'Global Business
Dialogue on E-Commerce' (GBDe) and 'Consumers International'
(CI) have agreed on common 'Alternative Dispute Resolution
Guidelines' for b2c-e-commerce, which contain recommendations
for enterprises, ODR service providers, and governments (GBDe,
2003).
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GLOBAL ODR STANDARDS
To implement the discussed standards for ODR service providers, a
number of measures have been discussed reaching from selfregulation to national outline legislation. In this context, the role of
the state tends to be more emphasized than this is usually the case
(Schultz, 2003). With respect to transnational consumer contract
law, the suggested ODR standards touch upon the relationship
between citizens and the state and, hence, they concern the kernel
of the law of the constitutional law set down in Article 6(1) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. On the one side, such standards have to be
developed and spread by institutions that leave no doubt about
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their neutrality face to conflicting interests and thus enjoy
unreserved trust of all involved (cf. ABA, 2002: 32 f.; Davis, 2002:
529). Initiatives for self-regulation, led by industry and commerce
such as the GBDe or the ICC, do not meet these criteria on their
own.50 On the other side, ODR standards that have been developed
with the support of states are advantageous as they can work as
guideline for judicial review in particular cases. The terms of trade
of ODR service providers as well as terms of trade clauses
concerning dispute settlement in consumer contracts cannot easily
been declared ineffective if they stand in accordance with globally
accepted ODR standards.
With the establishment of the European Extra-Judicial Network
(EEJ-NET) as well as the above mentioned EU-recommendations,
the European Commission in particular has demonstrated what a
functioning state organisation at the supranational level could
contribute. Following this model, the ABA Task Force has
discussed the set up of a 'Global Dispute Clearing House', which
would deal with issues arising out of cross-border consumer
contracts, which consumers could turn to if problems emerge and
which would be responsible for transferring conflicts to those ODR
procedures accredited on the basis of global ODR standards.
Furthermore, it was considered to establish an ODR trustmark,
which can be awarded to those ODR service providers following
ODR standards developed by the 'Global Online Standards
Commission' (ABA, 2002: 27 ff.; cf. Davis, 2002; Schultz, 2004).
Yet, the ABA Task Force concludes that the ODR market is not
mature enough in order to already set up binding standards ('not
one size fits all'). Moreover, an agreement about such standards in a

For this reason the GBDe developed its ADR Guidelines in cooperation
with Consumers International. The Guidelines call for governments to initiate
'government accreditation' and/or 'government-backed assessment rules’
together with industry and consumer representatives, and on a global level only.

50
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'Global Online Standards Commission' under international law is
unlikely due to the apparent divergences, eg, between the USA and
the EU concerning the authorisation of consumer arbitration
jurisdiction. Additionally, the accreditation of ODR providers with
a global ODR trustmark would require substantial financial and
personal resources, which would be desirable yet seem
unachievable. In the current situation, for companies it is of prime
importance to avoid dispute by setting up effective consumer
complaint
procedures
('customer
satisfaction
systems').
Furthermore, as a first step it is suggested to establish an 'i-ADRCenter', which is given the task of consolidating information about
available dispute resolution procedures on the web ('low cost, low
profile'). Without being assessed, ODR provider can initially
commit themselves to ODR standards such as the ABA Best
Practices. At first financed by the state, such a centre for
information could later function as a basis for the more advanced
notion of a 'Dispute-Clearinghouse' or 'ODR-Trustmark-Centers'
(ABA, 2002: 31 ff.).
More than two years after the ABA recommendations have been
published, however, the suggested 'i-ADR-Center' has not been
established; presumably no sponsor for the project could be found,
despite the pursued approach ('low cost, low profile'). Taking the
EEJ-NET as a blue print, the UN would actually be the right point
of contact. UNECE has indeed organized conferences concerning
ODR in 2002 and 2003 in Geneva; in 2004, the third 'UN-Forum on
Online Dispute Resolution' took place at the University of
Melbourne in cooperation with UNESCA.51 Due to its chronic lack
of financing and efficacy, the UN is hardly able to contribute more
than its name to the development of global ODR standards. The
organisation of the conferences as well as the publication of the
results was taken on by academic institutions. For instance, the

51

http://odrforum2004.themediationroom.com/
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'Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution'
(CITDR) at the University of Massachusetts provides the web site
www.odr.info, where not only the presentations of the UN-ODR
forum are published,52 but also broad information is available
about ODR providers, ODR standards, literature, etc. This actually
meets the described functions of the 'i-ADR-Center' suggested by
the ABA Task Force.53 Similar to the Transnational Law Database
CENTRAL concerning the Lex Mercatoria at the University of
Cologne, in the area of transnational consumer contract law science
can play an important part through the systematisation of
information.54
Finally, I would like to introduce the model of state incentives that
combines the compliance with certain standards and the granting
of legal privileges. Thus, the Act on ADR of North Rhine
Westphalia couples the accreditation of a mediation institution
with the advantage of executing a settlement comparable to a court
ruling, provided compliance with the standards of transparency
and fairness set forth in the Act.55 During the political debate on the
so-called Brussels-I-Regulation, the responsible committee of the
European Parliament suggested that in deviation to Article 17 of
the Regulation enterprises should be allowed to introduce a choice
of court clause in consumer contracts if in return they subject
themselves to an acknowledged out of court dispute settlement
body (Wallis, 2000). The notion that the state facilitates ADR
provided compliance with certain minimum conditions of due
process is well established in international commercial arbitration,

http://www.odr.info/unece2003/index.htm
Although the information is not always comprehensive and up to date,
since ODR.info relies on voluntary contributions mostly by academics.
54
See eg the Transnational Law Database on the New Law Merchant
established at the Center for Transnational Law (Professor K P Berger) of the
University of Cologne: www.tldb.net
55
The ‚GüSchlG NRW' is available through:
http://www.streitschlichtung.nrw.de/streit/gesetz.php
52
53
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where arbitral awards corresponding with the requirements
outlined in the 1958 New York Convention and the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law are recognized and enforced by the state
(Redfern and Hunter, 2004). It seems logical, yet hardly realistic to
suggest that taking the juridical review of private arbitral awards as
model, compliance with globally accepted ODR standards could be
guaranteed by setting up an international public online court,
where appeals against outcomes of ODR-procedures could be
lodged (see Schultz, 2003).

V. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have shown, that the private governance
mechanisms which have been developed in international commerce
between merchants in order to tackle opportunism in cross-border
economic exchange in a situation of constitutional uncertainty, i.e.
the absence of a world state effectively guaranteeing the protection
of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, recently have
successfully been adapted to the new phenomenon of cross-border
electronic commerce between businesses and consumers. Thus,
private ordering has proven to be a valuable alternative to state law
not only in the apolitical domain of merchant law, where
predominantly coordinative problems arise, but might as well
contribute to the solution of regulatory problems in the area of
consumer law, where the protection of weaker parties is at stake.
One reason for this success is that the protection of consumers is in
the rational self-interest of businesses which intend to engage in
cross-border commerce with foreign consumers: In order to
convince consumers to enter the borderless global retail-market,
businesses have to invest in building consumer confidence in
electronic commerce by employing various consumer protecting
governance mechanisms. Another reason is the emergence of
businesses which do not engage in the primary markets for
consumer products and services themselves, but act as market
makers between other businesses and consumers, and, thus, on a
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secondary market for private legal services: These intermediaries
are economically interested in attracting a maximum of sellers as
well as buyers to participate in their market places. Therefore, it lies
in their rational self-interest to act as a neutral party towards both
sides of the market, businesses as well as consumers. Electronic
market places are, therefore, in a perfect position to effectively
bundle different private governance mechanisms into what I call
consumer protecting civil regimes.
As has been shown in part three of this paper, however, a variety of
consumer protection concerns remain to be solved. If consumers on
the electronic world market place are able to choose between
different consumer protecting civil regimes, there is the need for
transparency with regard to the offered level of protection as well
as the effectiveness and fairness of such regimes. In other words
there is a need for substantive as well as procedural minimum
standards regarding the private provision of consumer protecting
services, i.e. ‘law-consumer protection’. As such standards for the
border-less character of b2c-e-commerce have to have a truly
transnational character, they are developed outside the traditional
international law sphere on the basis of co-regulatory efforts
between states, industry, and civil society actors. There can be
observed a variety of efforts to establish such global minimum
standards which contribute to the future establishment of a ‘civil
constitution’ of transnational consumer contract law.
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